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Based  on  their  theoretical  predictions,  Kliauga,  de  Gorter,  and  Just  (2008)  and  de  Gorter, 
Drabik, and Just (2010) argue that the United States and the European Union establish the world 
ethanol and biodiesel prices, respectively. We test these theories using cointegration analysis 
and the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model. Weekly price series are analyzed for the major 
global biofuel producers (European Union, United States, and Brazil) for the period 2002 – 
2010. Polices in the United States and Brazil appear to play an equal role in determining ethanol 
prices in other countries, thus only partially confirming the theoretical predictions. For biodiesel, 
our results demonstrate that the EU mandate impacts the world biodiesel price and thus they 
confirm the European Union’s price leadership established in theory.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  process  of  biofuel  (ethanol  or  biodiesel)  prices  formation  and  their  international 
interlinkages are important in understanding the worldwide biofuel price response to biofuel 
policies as well as to exogenous shocks, such as oil price fluctuations. The recent increase in the 
volatility  of  global commodity  prices  has  attracted  a  lot  of  policy  makers’  attention. 
Governments from around the world have introduced various measures to react to this structural 
change in the commodity markets. The biofuel sector plays a prominent role in this respect as it 
is perceived to be the key factor driving recent price developments. Understanding biofuel price 
interlinkages  also  allows  one  to  evaluate  the  efficiency  of  the  biofuel  policies  and  more 
specifically, to study the impact biofuel polices have on the commodity price changes.  
There  is  a  growing  body  of  literature  on  the  economics  of  biofuel  policies  and 
interlinkages  of  commodity  prices  (e.g.,  Balcombe  and  Rapsomanikis  2007;  Babcock  2008; 
Xiaodong and Hayes 2009; de Gorter and Just 2009, 2010; Zhang et al. 2009, 2010; de Gorter, 
Drabik,  and  Just  2010;  Ciaian  and  Kancs  2011).  Theoretical  studies  show  that  the  biofuel 
polices are the key factor affecting the biofuel prices. Given the current policies, according to 
Kliauga de Gorter, and Just (2008) and de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010) the world market 
price of biofuel is either (i) linked to the fossil fuel price adjusted by a tax credit (or exemption) 
in the country with a combination of the highest fossil fuel price and the lowest net tax or (ii) it 
is determined by a binding mandate if the biofuel price in the country is higher than under the 
case (i). This theory implies two empirically testable price relationships. First, if the tax credit 
(or exemption) drives biofuel prices, then one would observe that the crude oil price and the 
fossil fuel (gasoline, diesel) price in the price leading country determines the biofuel prices in 
other countries. Second, if the biofuel mandate determines the biofuel prices, then one would 
expect the biofuel price in the price leading country to determine the biofuel prices in other 
countries.  Kliauga,  de  Gorter,  and  Just  (2008)  showed  that  the  world  ethanol  price  has 
historically been determined in the United States. Similarly, de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010) 
demonstrated  that  the  European  Union  by  its  EU  biofuel  policy  has  determined  the  world 
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biodiesel price. The main shortcoming of those two studies is their empirical approach – they do 
not provide a rigorous econometric test of their theory.  
The objective of this paper is to rectify their empirical approach and formally test the 
validity of their theoretical conclusions. Notably, we examine the price leadership among the 
major  biofuel  players  –  the  European  Union  (proxied  by  Germany),  the  United  States,  and 
Brazil –representing more than 90 percent of the world biofuel market.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe 
biofuel policies in the countries analyzed. In Section 3, we formulate hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 4 describes the data used and Section 5 presents the cointegration techniques followed. 
Empirical results are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.  Biofuel Policies 
 
There is a variety of policies that can directly or indirectly impact either biofuel production or 
consumption.  The  first  category  includes  blenders’  tax  credits,  tax  exemptions,  mandates, 
production quotas, and production subsidies targeted on biofuel production, while the second 
group consists of policies such as import tariffs, production subsidies on biofuel feedstocks, or 
research and development subsidies. Given their importance in terms of the budgetary spending 
and frequency of their use in many countries, we focus only on the first tree policies listed (i.e., 
blenders’ tax credits, tax exemptions, and mandates). Furthermore, we only describe the policies 
used in the countries covered in the paper: United States, European Union, and Brazil. 
  Under a blender’s tax credit, the blender receives a subsidy per gallon of biofuel blended 
with a fossil fuel (i.e., gasoline or diesel, depending on the biofuel). This policy is used in the 
United States where, currently, the blender’s tax credit for ethanol is 52 cents per gallon of 
which 45 cents are granted from federal funds and the rest is the average state tax credit. Up to 
January 2010, biodiesel blenders enjoyed a tax credit of $1 per gallon of biodiesel blended with 
regular diesel. 
  A tax exemption represents a reduction in the fuel excise tax collected at the pump level 
in the European Union and Brazil. The economic impacts of a blender’s tax credit and tax 
exemption are identical in a closed economy – both constitute a biofuel consumption subsidy, 
but differ substantially in an open economy framework.
2 The level of the tax exemption varies 
among  the  EU  countries  and  between  biofuels,  but  it  is  on  a  decline  as  governments  are 
essentially forgoing considerable fiscal revenues from fuel taxes with this policy. For example, a 
tax exemption on biodiesel in Germany was reduced from 0.47 Euro per liter to 0.29 Euro per 
liter between 2005 and 2009. For Brazil, Kliauga, de Gorter, and Just (2008) report the average 
(consumption weighted) tax exemption of R$ 0.67 per liter which is approximately 2.7 times the 
U.S. tax credit. 
  A mandate is another widely used biofuel policy. In most cases it is combined with 
either a blender’s tax credit or a tax exemption. A biofuel mandate is used in two forms: a 
consumption mandate (e.g., in the United States) or a blend mandate (e.g., in the European 
Union, where it is termed a ‘target’). While the former establishes that a fixed amount of biofuel 
be blended with a fossil fuel, the latter requires that a fuel mix contain a certain percentage of a 
biofuel.  For  ease  of  implementation,  the  U.S.  Environmental  Protection  Agency  annually 
converts the consumption mandate into its blend equivalent based on a prediction of the annual 
U.S.  fuel  consumption;  for  instance,  the  blend  equivalent  of  the  U.S.  ethanol  consumption 
mandate has been set to 7.95 percent in 2011 (Reuters 2010). For comparison, a mandatory 10 
percent minimum target is set in the European Union for the share of biofuels in transport fuel 
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consumption  by  2020  (Directive  2009/28/EC).  In  Brazil,  25  percent  of  gasoline  fuel 
consumption has to come from ethanol (known as the E25 fuel). 
 
3.  The Theory of Biofuel Price Formation 
 
Theoretical studies show that biofuel polices are the key factor determining the biofuel price. 
For example, de Gorter and Just (2009, 2010) developed a model that explains the link between 
the U.S. biofuel policies – the blender’s tax credit or the biofuel mandate – and the biofuel price. 
In their model, biofuel (ethanol) and fossil fuel (gasoline) are assumed to be perfect substitutes 
and differ only in their energy content.
 They conclude that the price of the biofuel is determined 
either by a tax credit or a binding (consumption or blend) mandate, but never by both at a time.
3  
Consider first a case where a blender’s tax credit on ethanol, tc, (or a tax exemption) is 
the only biofuel policy. Then, based on the model the ethanol market price, PE, is directly linked 
to the world gasoline (oil) price, PG, and the fuel consumption tax, t, as follows: 
 
                     (1 ) E G c P P t t l l = - - +          (1) 
 
where  the  coefficient  λ  measures  miles  traveled  per  gasoline-equivalent  gallon  of  ethanol 
relative to a gallon of gasoline.
4 An implication of equation (1) is that if the fuel tax and the tax 
credit do not change over time (as it has been the case in all countries included in our study for 
at least some time), then the volatility in the world oil price should be transmitted into the 
ethanol market price, provided that the blender’s tax credit is binding.  
Alternatively, assume there is only a biofuel mandate that dictates a certain amount of 
biofuel to be blended. Although the economics of a consumption mandate differs somewhat 
from that of a blend mandate (see de Gorter and Just 2009, 2010 for details), the common 
outcome of the two policies is that, unlike with a blender’s tax credit, the biofuel price is not 
directly linked to the world oil price: the link is completely severed with a consumption mandate 
(because the biofuel price is determined by the intersection of the ethanol supply curve and a 
fixed mandate level) and it is partially severed with a blend mandate insofar as a change in the 
oil price impacts the fuel demand. The intuition behind this result is that the biofuel price is 
more  determined  by  the  biofuel  supply  than  by  the  fossil  fuel  price  for  a  given  mandate 
constraint. In the case of a blend mandate, only with an inelastic biofuel supply, will the price of 
biofuels be strongly linked to a fossil fuel price (see Appendix).  
Finally, suppose (as it is usually the case in reality) that a blender’s tax credit (a tax 
exemption)  is  combined  with  a  biofuel  mandate.  For  a  mandate  to  bind,  the  biofuel  price 
premium (i.e., the difference between the ethanol market price with a policy in place and the 
gasoline market price in the absence of a biofuel policy) due to a mandate has to be greater than 
the amount of a tax credit – otherwise the relationship (1) holds.  
  So far, we have described the biofuel market price formation in a closed economy. There 
is, however, trade in biofuels and so a question arises as to how the world price of biofuels is 
established – the question of interest in this paper. Based on the theory above, Kliauga, de 
Gorter, and Just (2008) and de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010) argue that only one country’s 
policy  and  market  situation  determines  the  world  biofuel  price  and  therefore  either  of  the 
following situations holds (but never both):  
(i)  The world biofuel market price is determined by the fossil fuel price adjusted by a miles 
per gallon coefficient and a tax credit (or tax exemption) in the country with a combination 
of the highest consumer price paid for fossil fuel and the lowest net tax (the combination of 
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ethanol consumption is below the level dictated by a consumption mandate, the ethanol price can still be deter-
mined by the mandate most of the year. For details on this see de Gorter and Just (2010). 
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the lowest fuel tax and highest biofuel tax credit/tax exemption).  
(ii)  The world biofuel market price is determined by a binding mandate if the induced biofuel 
price is higher than under the case (i).  
The general implication of the relationships (i) and (ii) is that the impact of biofuel policies (tax 
exemptions,  tax  credits,  or  price  premia  due  to  biofuel  mandates)  on  biofuel  prices  are  not 
additive:  the  market  price  of  a  biofuel  is  not  determined  by  the  sum  of  each  country’s  tax 
exemption, tax credit, or mandate price premium.  
Transportation costs and tariffs also affect biofuel prices. However, they do not affect the 
direction of causation of the price relationships (i) and (ii). The transportation costs and tariffs 
may only weaken these relationships.
5 For example, if the United States is the price leader for 
ethanol, then ethanol prices in other countries  are likely to decrease by  transportation costs 
and/or tariffs, or may be independent of the U.S. price if the transportation costs and/or tariffs 
are prohibitive. 
  Based on the theoretical predictions (i) – (ii) we can establish two hypotheses which we 
test empirically in next sections. 
 
Hypothesis 1: If the biofuel and fossil fuel (gasoline or diesel) price of a country determines 
biofuel prices (ethanol or biodiesel, respectively) of other countries, then relationship (i) holds 
(i.e., the tax credit (or tax exemption) determines biofuel prices).
6  
 
Hypothesis 1 says that if a country’s biofuel and fossil fuel price has an impact on biofuel prices 
in other countries, then this country is the biofuel price leader. This is because the net tax policy 
(on gasoline/diesel and biofuels combined) of this country provides the most favorable biofuel 
price  at  world  level  which  will  be  followed  by  other  countries.  We  expect  that  ethanol 
(biodiesel) and gasoline (diesel) prices of the price leader determine ethanol (biodiesel) prices in 
other countries. Totally differentiating equation (1) yields l = G E dP dP which implies that the 
relationship between world fossil fuel and biofuel prices in the price leading country is linear 
and is determined only by the conversion coefficient λ. Given that  l  is approximately equal to 
0.7 for ethanol and 0.89 for biodiesel, the price relationship is expected to be strong if indeed 
Hypothesis 1 holds.  
 
Hypothesis 2: If a biofuel (ethanol or biodiesel) price of a country determines biofuel prices in 
other countries, then the relationship (ii) holds (i.e., the mandate determines biofuel prices).
7  
 
Hypothesis 2 says that the mandate implemented in the price setting country determines the 
world biofuel prices. With a binding mandate, the biofuel prices tend to be isolated from the 
fossil fuel market. Based on the model by de Gorter and Just (2009), we have estimated the price 
response of ethanol to changes in the world gasoline price in the price setting country (assuming 
an exogenous gasoline price). The derivative is negative and very small, between -0.1 and -0.01 
(Appendix and Table 1). In summary, if Hypothesis 2 holds, we should observe that the ethanol 
(biodiesel)  price  of  the  price  leader  influences  ethanol  (biodiesel)  prices  in  other  countries 
(because fossil and biofuels tend to be isolated) and/or that the relationship between the fossil 
fuel  price  and  biofuels  is  negative  (as  per  Appendix).  Comparing  the  Hypothesis  1  and 
Hypothesis 2, the former implies stronger interdependencies between biofuel and fossil fuel 
prices. The mandate tends to isolate the biofuel and fossil fuel prices, thus reducing biofuel 
                                                 
5 In principle, export subsidies may invert the causality of prices summarized in (i) and (ii). However, this type of 
trade policy is not applied in reality, particularly so by the major world biofuel players. 
6 Given that a tax credit ( tax exemption) (and also a fuel tax) tends to be fixed over a longer period, the endogenous 
fossil fuel prices in the price leading country determine the biofuel prices in other countries. 
7 This follows from the fact that if the mandate determines biofuel price in the price leader country, then the biofuel 
and fuel markets are isolated from each other. In this case the fossil fuel price will be independent of the biofuel 
price. 6 
 
dependence on fossil fuel price. 
 
4.  Data 
Our  data  consist  of  weekly  price  observations  for  ethanol  and  gasoline  (January,  2002  to 
December, 2010), biodiesel and diesel (June, 2005 to December, 2010), and crude oil for the 
European Union, the United States, and Brazil. The EU data are proxied by German ethanol, 
biodiesel, gasoline, and diesel prices extracted from the Bloomberg database, UFOP (The Union 
for Promotion of Oil and Protein Plants), and the EU Commission’s Oil bulletin (gasoline and 
diesel),  respectively.  The  U.S.  Gulf  ethanol  and  biodiesel  prices  come  from  the  Bloomberg 
database, while the U.S. Gulf gasoline and diesel prices are from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Finally, Brazilian ethanol and gasoline prices are for Sao Paolo (the biggest 
Brazilian ethanol producing state) and come from the Center for Advanced Studies in Applied 
Economics  and  the  Brazilian  National  Agency  of  Petroleum,  Natural  Gas,  and  Biofuels, 
respectively. 
 
5.  Cointegration 
Theoretical  findings  from  the  previous  section  suggest  that  fuel  prices  are  interdependent. 
Applying a standard regression approach to these data would violate the exogeneity assumption 
of a regression equation. A general approach to analyze interdependences between endogenous 
variables is the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model where the causality between the current 
and past values of the variables is examined. The standard requirement for the VAR estimation 
is  the  stationarity  of  the  time  series.  However,  even  if  the  individual  time  series  are  not 
stationary  a  combination  of  two  non-stationary  time  series  may  be  stationary  (Engle  and 
Granger, 1987). In this special case, the time series are said to be cointegrated, i.e., there exists a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between them and a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model 
(that adds error correction features to the VAR model) can be estimated. 
    To test for the stationarity of time series, we use two unit root tests: the augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips Perron (PP) test. The number of lags of the dependent 
variable is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). If the time series are not 
stationary,  we  employ  the  Johansen's  cointegration  method  to  examine  the  long-term 
relationship between the price series. This method allows us to test for the cointegration of 
several time series and does not require them to be of the same order of integration. The number 
of cointegrating vectors is determined by a lambda max test and a trace test. Both tests use 
eigenvalues to compute associated test statistics. The null hypothesis of the test statistics is the 
existence of at most r cointegrating vectors. We follow the Pantula principle in order to decide 
whether or not, the deterministic components (time trend and constant term) should be included 
in the model.  
We first perform a bivariate Johansen cointegration test on the pairs of prices. Based on 
the  patterns  obtained  from  the  bivariate  case,  we  test  for  multivariate  cointegration.  The 
bivariate case ignores a possible integration of two markets through a third market, i.e., there 
may exist a long-run cointegration relationship that ties several markets together whereas such a 
relationship is not found between two markets alone (Harris, 1995) 
We determine the number of lags to be included in the model. Then, we estimate a VAR 
model  for  cointegrated  variables  in  which  we  include  a mechanism  of  the  error  correction 
model. Next, we use the AIC and the LR tests. In the event that the two tests yield different 
results, we consider each possibility and first follow the AIC. The adequacy of our VEC model 
is tested by a series of tests: the Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation in the residuals; the 
Jarque-Berra test for normality in residuals; and the stability test of the VEC model estimates.  
A possible cointegration relationship between the price series, does not automatically 
imply a causal relationship between them. Causality tests show whether or not a country is the 
price leader and which countries are price followers (or it can well be the case that none of the 
countries dominates the others) (Ciaian and Kancs, 2011). If two variables are cointegrated, 7 
 
causality in at least one direction must exist. This Granger causality can be detected through the 
VEC  model  derived  from  the  long  run  cointegrating  vectors.  Statistical  significance  of  the 
differenced explanatory variables provides information about the short run causal relationships 
between the variables, while the significance of the lagged error correction term explains the 
long run causal relationships. However, Granger causality detected through F-tests and t-tests of 
the VEC variables may be interpreted only within the sample period. We therefore employ the 
Variance Decomposition technique to measure the effect of shocks to each price on the current 
and future values of the same and other prices. We perform a decomposition of the variance 
associated with each price in the VEC model caused by shocks to the other prices after 1 to 48 
weeks. By this, we can examine the price relationships summarized in Hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e., 
we can examine which country’s prices cause biofuel prices in other countries. 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
To get a first impression on the strength of prices interdependence, we report the correlation 
coefficients in Table 2. The correlation analysis confirms a high and positive correlation (0.717) 
between the ethanol prices in Brazil and Europe. There is also a positive correlation between the 
EU and U.S. ethanol prices (0.649), as well as between the United States and Brazil (0.614). The 
correlation  between  biodiesel  prices  in  the  EU  and  U.S.  markets  is  even  stronger  (0.969) 
(Table 3). 
    However, before making any judgments about the relationship between the prices, we 
first need to analyze the characteristics of the time series. The use of non-stationary time series 
could lead to statistically significant results due to a spurious regression. Based on the Dickey 
Fuller and Phillips Perron tests, all time series are non-stationary. We achieved stationarity by 
taking first differences of the series.  
    Next, to be able to test for interdependencies between prices, we examined whether there 
exist a cointegrating vector among fossil fuel and biofuel. The results show that gasoline and 
ethanol prices are cointegrated, except for two price pairs: EU – Brazilian ethanol price, and EU 
ethanol – Brazilian gasoline price (Table 4). All the ethanol and gasoline prices are strongly 
cointegrated with crude oil prices with an exemption of the relationship crude oil – EU ethanol. 
Both  the  trace  and  the  likelihood  ratio  tests  reject  the  absence  of  cointegration  relationship 
between the EU and U.S. biodiesel prices, and the EU and U.S. diesel prices at a 1 percent 
significance level. The rest of diesel – biodiesel price series is found not to be cointegrated. The 
crude oil prices and biodiesel or diesel prices are not cointegrated either.  
    Results  of  the  multivariate  Johansen  cointegration  test  indicate  that  the  series  under 
consideration are cointegrated of rank 3 in the case of gasoline and ethanol, and of rank 1 for the 
biodiesel and diesel prices. The cointegration analysis shows that fossil fuel and biofuel prices 
are interlinked. However, the cointegration analysis cannot predict the direction of causality 
between the price series. To identify the causality relationships we estimate the VAR model.  
 
Variance Decomposition 
Based on the VEC results, we perform variance decomposition of the price relationships to 
examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. The variance decomposition indicates how much the current and 
future values of a price can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables. According 
to the results reported in Table 5, in all three countries ethanol prices are most responsive to 
their  own  lagged  values.  However,  effect  decreases  over  time.  The  lagged  ethanol  price 
contributes to the variance of the own ethanol prices by more than 55 percent. The rest of price 
series  (i.e.,  gasoline  prices,  non-lagged  ethanol  prices,  and  the  crude  oil  price)  participate 
individually with less than 45 percent in the variance of ethanol prices.  
The U.S. ethanol price contributes to the variance of the European ethanol prices after 48 
weeks by 4.1 percent. The relative variance in ethanol prices in Europe is then caused by the 
shocks to the Brazil ethanol prices (3.82 percent) and partially by the shocks to the gasoline 
market in the three countries (almost 5 percent all combined). The crude oil seems to have only 8 
 
a minor impact on the EU ethanol price (less than 0.5 percent). 
On the other hand, the  relative variance in the  U.S ethanol prices is resistant to the 
shocks  to  the  EU  ethanol  prices  (0.07  percent  after  48  weeks).  The  Brazilian  ethanol  price 
participates with 3.42 percent in the variance of the U.S. ethanol prices after 48 weeks. The 
relative variance in the U.S. ethanol prices caused by the shocks to Brazilian gasoline prices is 
even  stronger,  16.34  percent.  The  variance  decomposition  results  further  support  only  a 
marginal impact of the U.S. gasoline prices (0.70 percent after 48 weeks) and of the EU gasoline 
price (less than 0.59 percent) on the U.S. ethanol prices. Finally, crude oil has a sizable impact 
on the U.S. ethanol price (14.15 percent). 
The Brazilian ethanol price reacts particularly to crude oil price (14.79 percent), U.S. 
ethanol (12.86 percent), and U.S. gasoline (7.97 percent). Other prices show minor importance 
(less than 3.5 percent).  
The results in Table 5 confirm that for ethanol hypothesis 1 tends to prevail relative to 
Hypothesis 2. Gasoline in other countries and the crude oil prices explain 4.02,
8 24, and 31 
percent of the ethanol price variation in the European Union, Brazil, and the United States, 
respectively (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, the other countries’ ethanol price contributes 
with 3.49,
9 7.92, and 16.30 percent to the ethanol price variation in the United States, European 
Union, and Brazil, respectively (Hypothesis 2).  
The  U.S.  and  Brazilian  policies  appear  to  play  an  equal  role  in  determining  ethanol 
prices in other countries. The U.S. ethanol and gasoline contribute to the variance of the EU and 
Brazil ethanol prices by 5.04 
10 and 20.83 percent, respectively. Brazilian ethanol and gasoline 
prices contribute to the variance of the EU and U.S. ethanol prices by 6.48 percent and 19.76 
percent, respectively. The EU plays a minor role in determining ethanol prices in other countries 
(less than 5 percent).  
These results partly confirm the prediction of Kliauga, de Gorter, and Just (2008) that the 
United States is the price leader for ethanol. Contrary to their findings, we find that both the 
United States and Brazil play an equal role. However, the mechanism of price determination 
differs between the two countries. Both the United States and Brazil impact the EU ethanol 
through  the  ethanol  price.  However,  the  reciprocal  effects  are  different.  The  United  States 
determines Brazilian ethanol price mainly through the ethanol price (confirming Hypothesis 2), 
whereas  Brazil  affects  the  U.S.  ethanol  mainly  through  the  gasoline  price  (confirming 
Hypothesis 1). The crude oil price is important in the United States and Brazil in affecting 
ethanol prices but not in the European Union. 
With regards to biodiesel, akin to the ethanol, most of the variance in all biodiesel prices 
can be explained by its own innovations (more than 70 percent) (Table 6). The effect of the 
shocks to the EU biodiesel price on the current and future values of U.S. biodiesel price is much 
stronger than vice versa. The European biodiesel price contributes to the variance of the U.S. 
biodiesel prices after 48 weeks by 19.4 percent, while it is only 1.01 percent vice versa. The EU 
biodiesel is significantly affected by the EU diesel price (18.95 percent). Other prices play only 
a  minor  role  in  determining  biodiesel  prices  in  the  European  Union  and  the  United  States. 
Notably, an insignificant impact has been observed for the crude oil price on the biodiesel prices 
in both countries (less than 0.40 percent). These results confirm Hypothesis 2 and the prediction 
of de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010) that the European Union is the price leader in the world 
biodiesel market.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has empirically examined the theoretical findings of Kliauga, de Gorter, and Just 
(2008) and de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010). These papers show two patterns of the interaction 
                                                 
8 4.02% = 0.94 U.S. gasoline + 2.66 Brazil gasoline + 0.42 Crude oil. 
9 3.49% = 0.07% EU ethanol + 3.42 Brazil ethanol  
10 5.04% = 4.1% U.S. ethanol + 0.94 U.S. gasoline. 9 
 
between biofuel policies and biofuel price determination. First, if the tax credit (exemption) is 
the driver of biofuel prices, then one would observe a price behavior where the crude oil price 
and  the  fossil  fuel  (gasoline  or  diesel)  prices  in  the  price  leading  country  determine  world 
biofuel prices. Second, if the biofuel mandate determines biofuel prices, then one would expect 
that biofuel (ethanol or biodiesel) price in the price leading country determines the world biofuel 
price.  
   In the case of the ethanol, the other countries’ gasoline and crude oil prices explain 
between 4 and 31 percent of ethanol price variation. On the other hand, the other countries’ 
ethanol price contributes to the ethanol price variation by 3.5 to 16 percent. We also find that the 
U.S. and Brazilian ethanol polices appear to be of equal importance in determining ethanol 
prices in other countries, thus partially confirming the prediction of Kliauga, de Gorter and Just 
(2008). However, the mechanism of price determination differs for these countries. The United 
States  tends  to  cause  the  Brazilian  ethanol  predominantly  through  the  mandate  (confirming 
Hypothesis 2), whereas Brazil affects the U.S. ethanol mainly through the ethanol tax exemption 
policy (confirming the Hypothesis 1).  
  For biodiesel, our results demonstrate that the EU mandate impacts the world biodiesel 
price (Hypothesis 2) and confirm the prediction of de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2010) that the 
EU is the price leader in the world biodiesel market. 
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To illustrate how biofuel price relationships are affected by a blend mandate, we perform a 
comparative static exercise for the impact of an exogenous fossil fuel (without loss of generality, 
we assume gasoline) price change on the biofuel price (ethanol),  G E dP dP , in the price leading 
country.  The derivations are based on the model presented in Figure 1 in de Gorter and Just 
(2009).  
The equilibrium conditions in the fuel market with an exogenous gasoline price and a 
binding blend mandate are given by: 
 
                                                         ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 F E c G
E E F F
P P t P
S P D P
a a
a
= - + -
=
                                              (A1) 
 
where PF , PE , and PG denote price of fuel, ethanol, and gasoline, respectively; tc denotes a tax 
credit; a  denotes a blend mandate (e.g., 10 percent), and SE and DF denotes ethanol supply and 
fuel demand functions, respectively.  
Totally differentiating system (A1) yields: 
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where  ' F D  and  ' E S  are the first derivatives of the fuel demand and ethanol supply functions , 
respectively, with respect to their arguments. 


















Transformation to the elasticity form yields: 
 














                                           (A3) 
 
where  DF h denotes demand elasticity of fuel and  SE h denotes supply elasticity of ethanol. 
We extract needed elasticities from de Gorter and Just (2009) to calibrate the derivative (A3). 
The results are reported in Table 1. 12 
 
Table 1. The Magnitude of  G E dP dP  for the United States with a Binding Blend Mandate and an Exogenous Gasoline Price 
Year










dP E/dP G              
(for η DF = -0.10)
dP E/dP G              
(for η DF = -0.26)
dP E/dP G              
(for η DF = -0.40)
2001-02 0.015 13.60 1.59 0.95 0.96 -0.012 -0.031 -0.048
2002-03 0.021 9.30 1.13 0.76 0.77 -0.015 -0.040 -0.062
2003-04 0.025 8.60 1.25 0.96 0.97 -0.015 -0.038 -0.059
2004-05 0.029 8.60 1.60 1.13 1.14 -0.016 -0.041 -0.063
2005-06 0.038 6.90 1.62 1.49 1.49 -0.015 -0.039 -0.060
2006-07 0.048 5.10 2.61 1.99 2.02 -0.024 -0.063 -0.096
2008-09 0.070 3.10 2.40 3.00 2.96 -0.024 -0.063 -0.097
Source: calculated13 
 
















U.S. ethanol 0.649 1.000
Brazilian ethanol 0.717 0.614 1.000
EU gasoline 0.857 0.736 0.757 1.000
U.S. gasoline 0.826 0.762 0.723 0.976 1.000
Brazilian gasoline 0.919 0.673 0.860 0.919 0.880 1.000
Crude oil 0.871 0.696 0.760 0.975 0.962 0.915 1.000




Table 3.  Correlation between Biodiesel, Diesel, and Crude Oil Prices 
Variable










U.S. diesel 0.969 1.000
EU biodiesel 0.860 0.795 1.000
U.S. biodiesel 0.778 0.735 0.897 1.000
Crude oil 0.082 0.026 0.365 0.355 1.000
Source: calculated  14 
 
Table 4.  Cointegration Results 
r = 0 r = 1 r = 0 r = 1
EU ethanol – Brazilian ethanol 16.03 *** 3.03 13.00 *** 3.03
EU ethanol – U.S. ethanol 20.95 4.78 ** 16.17 4.78 **
EU ethanol – EU gasoline 20.04 5.87 ** 14.17 5.87 *
EU ethanol – U.S. gasoline 21.93 5.48 ** 16.45 5.48 **
EU ethanol - Brazilian gasoline 15.77 *** 4.33 11.44 *** 4.33
U.S. ethanol – Brazilian ethanol 20.43 3.97 ** 16.47 3.97 **
U.S. ethanol - Brazilian gasoline 24.03 4.49 ** 19.54 4.49 **
U.S. ethanol - EU gasoline 29.18 8.42 *** 20.76 8.42 ***
U.S. ethanol - U.S. gasoline 29.69 7.55 *** 22.14 7.55 ***
U.S. gasoline - EU gasoline 47.86 8.63 *** 39.24 8.63 ***
Brazilian ethanol – Brazilian gasoline 23.07 4.13 ** 18.94 4.13 **
Brazilian ethanol - U.S. gasoline 20.79 3.74 ** 17.05 3.74 **
Brazilian ethanol - EU gasoline 20.96 5.64 ** 15.33 5.64 *
Brazilian gasoline – U.S. gasoline 29.86 4.43 *** 25.43 4.43 ***
Brazilian gasoline - EU gasoline 29.99 5.31 *** 24.67 5.31 ***
Crude oil - EU ethanol 18.72 *** 4.44 14.28 *** 4.44
Crude oil - U.S. ethanol 24.18 6.36 ** 17.82 6.36 **
Crude oil - Brazilian ethanol 20.17 4.58 ** 15.60 4.58 *
Crude oil - EU gasoline 34.36 5.34 *** 29.02 5.34 ***
Crude oil - U.S. Gasoline 30.08 4.74 *** 30.08 4.74 ***
Crude oil Brazilian gasoline 28.69 4.64 *** 24.05 4.64 ***
EU biodiesel – EU diesel 12.29
*** 3.48 8.81
*** 3.48
EU biodiesel – U.S. biodiesel 32.53 3.60
*** 28.93 3.60
***
EU biodiesel – U.S. diesel 12.81 *** 4.42 8.39 *** 4.42
EU diesel – U.S. biodiesel 17.46 *** 3.07 14.39 *** 3.07
U.S. diesel - EU diesel 27.85 4.10
*** 23.75 4.10
***
U.S. biodiesel – U.S. diesel 14.29
*** 2.57 11.72
*** 2.57
Crude oil - EU diesel 7.70
*** 2.84 4.86
*** 2.84
Crude oil - EU biodiesel 10.14
*** 1.89 8.25
*** 1.89
Crude oil - U.S. diesel 11.71
*** 3.88 7.83
*** 3.88




Note: * significant at a 10% level, ** significant at a 5% level, *** significant at a 1% level
Trace test λ max test
 15 
 















1 ∆ EU ethanol 95.86 2.09 2.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 94.03 2.16 3.22 0.05 0.42 0.06 0.07
12 90.04 3.75 4.48 0.29 0.32 0.84 0.28
24 87.84 4.47 3.97 0.69 0.80 1.73 0.50
48 87.05 4.10 3.82 1.01 0.94 2.66 0.42
1 ∆ U.S. ethanol 0.00 98.39 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.33 98.24 0.91 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.04
12 0.15 96.18 0.97 0.05 0.22 1.28 1.14
24 0.09 80.71 1.95 0.43 0.19 9.78 6.83
48 0.07 64.74 3.42 0.59 0.70 16.34 14.15
1 ∆ Brazilian ethanol 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 1.78 0.78 95.44 0.60 0.03 0.57 0.79
12 3.71 9.18 72.91 1.89 1.88 0.29 10.12
24 3.52 13.24 59.85 1.60 6.20 1.09 14.51
48 3.44 12.86 57.22 1.24 7.97 2.48 14.79
Source: calculated
Note:   - change












∆ EU diesel ∆ U.S. diesel
1 ∆ EU biodiesel 99.13 0.87 0.00 0.00
4 97.28 1.13 0.09 1.03
12 91.26 1.08 6.57 0.95
24 83.81 1.06 14.48 0.55
48 79.62 1.01 18.95 0.34
1 ∆ U.S.  0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00
4 5.22 92.37 0.28 1.88
12 14.70 79.98 0.34 4.60
24 17.93 75.40 1.48 4.82
48 19.40 72.97 2.63 4.65
Source: calculated










Percentage of forecasted variance explained by innovations in…
∆ Crude oil
0.00
Number 
of weeks
0.46
0.15
 
 